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5 Of Moral Rights and Legal Transplants
Connecting Laws, Connecting Cultures
Elizabeth Adeney*
5.1 Introduction
The movement of a doctrine, principle or set of rules from one body of
law into another appears to be an irresistible invitation to metaphor. The
new law is ‘received’ or ‘imported’ or ‘adopted’ into the old law. More
negatively, the old law may be seen as ‘infected’ by foreign material1 or
the new law may ‘irritate’ the recipient body.2 Other metaphors are more
focussed on the actions of the mover. The image of legal ‘transplantation’
has existed since early in the twentieth century, alluding at first to the
horticultural act of transferring a plant, propagated elsewhere, into for-
eign earth.3 In the 1960s transplantation took on a new range of associ-
ations as human organ transplants (the metaphor within the metaphor)
became more successful.4 With those associations came the related
images of ‘rejection’ through ‘immune reactions’ in the recipient law.5
The movement in metaphors from horticulture to surgery involved a
problematic simplification of the transplant concept since the metaphor
suggested, barring any ‘tissue rejection’, the continued performance by
the transplanted organ of its original function, without change either to
itself or the receiving body. The surgical imagery has been criticised for
this reason, Teubner pointing out that a legal transplant may both
* Sam Ricketson was the supervisor of my doctoral thesis on moral rights, and like all the
best supervisors, he set the bar extremely high. The constant challenge throughout those
years was to uncover materials on this subject that Sam had not already written about!
1 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal irritants: Good faith in British law or how unifying law ends up
in new divergences’ (1998) 61(1) Modern Law Review 11.
2 Ibid., 11, 20.
3 Cairns traces the metaphor to Frederick P Walton in 1927, followed by R W Lee and
Hermann Mannheim in the 1930s: John W Cairns, ‘Watson, Walton, and the history of
legal transplants’ (2013) 41 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 637,
688ff.
4 Ibid., 643, noting the explicit analogy with organ transplantation in Otto Kahn-Freund,
‘On uses and misuses of comparative law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1 (delivered in
1973 as the second Chorley Lecture, London School of Economics).
5 Teubner, ‘Legal irritants’, 12.
64
Across Intellectual Property : Essays in Honour of Sam Ricketson, edited by Graeme W. Austin, et al., Cambridge University
         Press, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/deakin/detail.action?docID=6144321.

































undergo and activate transformations in its new environment.6 It may be
that the older horticultural image offered the better analogy to legal
development. As wine-makers know, the soil into which the vine is
transplanted will affect the grapes. Conversely, judicious planting can
improve soil and unwise planting may impair it.
Legal transplantation is one expression of this section’s theme of
traversing regimes. Every transplant connects a source with a destination
in more or less complex and productive ways. The plant in question in
the present chapter is the moral right of authors as conceived of in civil
law countries and as transplanted into the statutes of a number of
common law countries. It is part of the network of intellectual property
(IP) laws connecting legal systems, lawyers and creators around the
world. As is further elaborated in this chapter, Sam Ricketson in his
writings has for decades both elucidated the building and functioning
of this network and encouraged the propagation of new concepts in
Australian law.
5.2 Forms and Purposes of Legal Transplantation
It has been asked whether legal transplants can ever function effectively
in the receiving legal system. In the eighteenth century Montesquieu
considered them a chancy venture.7 In the following century, when
Napoleonic imperialism prompted nationalism in subject states, it was
strongly argued that legal transplantation was a flawed method of legal
development. Roman law in particular was criticised for its inability to
reflect the thinking of northern European populations.8 English and
6 Ibid. This insight was not new. Kahn-Freund, in introducing the surgical metaphor, had
spoken of ‘adjustments’ to the received organ: Kahn-Freund, ‘On uses and misuses of
comparative law’, 6. See also AlanWatson, ‘Afterword’, in Legal Transplants: An Approach
to Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993), p. 116:
‘Transplanting frequently, perhaps always, involves legal transformation. Even when the
transplanted rule remains unchanged, its impact in a new social setting may be different.
The insertion of an alien rule into another complex system may cause it to operate in a
fresh way’ (notes omitted).
7 Charles de Secondat, Baron deMontesquieu,De l’Esprit des Loix (Geneva: Barrillot et fils,
1748), bk 1, ch. 3 (‘Des loix positives’).
8 Jacob Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956), p. xvii,
complaining that: Roman law ‘is not indigenous, has not been bred or grown on our
soil; in significant fundamentals it is contrary to our way of thinking and therefore cannot
satisfy us. … it casts no light on our history and our history casts no light on it’ (my
translation).
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Scandinavian law were admired as more fruitfully aligned with the cul-
tures of their people.9
In the twentieth century doubts continued to be raised about the
wisdom of legal transplantation. While Alan Watson pointed out the
frequency and success of transplants,10 Kahn-Freund counselled cau-
tion, arguing that some transplants should not be contemplated without
a detailed knowledge of the source legal culture.11 These positions do not
necessarily conflict, much depending on whether an idea on the one
hand, or a system-specific elaboration of that idea on the other – sup-
ported by untransplantable legal or political culture – is sought to be
adopted.
Without insisting too much on the horticultural metaphor (since
metaphors in the law should not be allowed to assume a life of their
own), transplants take, roughly speaking, at least three different forms.
The first is the transplantation of substantial parts of a legal system to
rule a subjugated country. Such was the movement of English law into
Australia, New Zealand, India and North America and of Roman law
into central Europe. This type of transplantation often accompanies the
movement of a whole culture or population or demographic group from
one part of the world to another. For better or worse, it is generally an act
of legal imperialism.
The second is the transplantation of rules and principles which seem to
work well in their country of origin, in the hope that their effects will be
duplicated in their receiving country and will solve identified problems
there.12 Such a transplant is motivated by internal concerns in the
receiving state; in this sense the recourse to foreign laws is an indigenous
development. In other senses this is a problematic form of legal growth
since a law or set of laws will inevitably operate differently in different
legal cultures. Success will depend on how ambitious the transplant is,
how similar it is to existing legal structures, and how carefully it is
bedded down.
The third form of transplantation – and the most relevant here – is that
which is mediated through a multilateral treaty. This form of
9 Ibid., xviii: ‘England, Sweden, Norway and other countries, which have not been
immediately exposed to [Roman law] … certainly have the retention of indigenous
laws to thank for many valuable advantages in their community life’ (my translation).
10 Watson, Legal Transplants, 95–6.
11 Kahn-Freund, ‘On uses and misuses of comparative law’, 27.
12 Some would call the suggested incorporation of the ‘fair use’ concept into Australian
copyright law a transplant of this kind. For discussion of the suggestion see Australian
Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Copyright and the Digital Economy, Report
No. 122 (2013), chs 4 and 5.
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transplantation has been common over the last century, with the material
to be transplanted not sourced directly from the law of another state.
Rather, the principles to which the source laws give effect are formulated
in an agreed form, often after long periods of negotiation, with member
states agreeing to enact counterpart provisions in their own domestic
laws. The purpose may be harmonisation of world or regional law, for the
better functioning of the world community. More precisely, in the case of
the main IP treaties, the purpose is the softening of the effect of jurisdic-
tional boundaries and the enabling of cross-border litigation.
A secondary purpose is the exportation of social norms, in this case a
heightened respect for the act of authorship.
Such treaties are driven by the exporters of law. The transplant is to a
greater or lesser degree imposed by the source states on the newer state
parties in return for the benefits of treaty membership. But due to
negotiating pressures even older state parties, which have participated
at the negotiation stage, find themselves bound by provisions that are not
necessarily in the form they would have chosen. This is the case with
moral rights law.
5.3 From Source Countries to Treaty, the Intermediate Step
The legal transplantation of moral rights into Australia was initiated by
their adoption, in article 6bis, into the Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention),13 achieved
largely through the work of the Italian delegation at and before the
1928 Rome Revision Conference. The formulation of article 6bis at
Rome was crucial to the future success of the rights. At this point the
antecedents of article 6bis were already well established in France, Ger-
many, Italy and other European states. However, each of these countries
had constructed the moral right differently, so that there was no one
doctrine or rule to export. In France it was initially a creature of juris-
prudence and was perpetual;14 in Germany it was developed doctrinally
and legislatively and had limited duration.15 Jurists in these countries
conceived of it as a single ‘droit moral’ or ‘authorial personality right’.16
13 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for
signature 9 September 1886, 828 UNTS 221 (entered into force 5 December 1887),
as amended.
14 Henri Desbois, Le droit d’auteur en France, 3rd ed. (Paris: Dalloz, 1978), p. 470.
15 KUG of 9 January 1907 § 25, LUG of 19 June 1907 § 29.
16 The jurist Josef Kohler in Germany had classified it as an Individualrecht, Otto von
Gierke as a Persönlichkeitsrecht. The French jurist André Morillot used the term droit
moral.
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Across Europe it was composed of a variety of prerogatives expressed in
wording that was individual to each national legal system.
The formulation chosen by the Berne negotiators was a reworking of
the source concepts. A singular and inclusive concept had fragmented,
and some of its component prerogatives – for example, the right of
withdrawal,17 the right to release the work to the public18 or the right
to continue making changes to the work19 – had been discarded. The
negotiators had committed themselves to certain core values, fixing the
rights in an apolitical form and making no assumptions about a recipient
country’s administrative or legal structures.
The values on which all parties could agree were the essential inde-
pendence of the moral rights from the economic rights, the fact that they
would remain with the author despite any copyright transfer, that the
author should have a right to be associated by name with his or her work
and that certain ‘derogatory’ alterations to the work, ‘prejudicial’ to the
author’s honour or reputation, should be actionable. The notions of
honour and reputation were an elaboration, for the benefit of the common
law countries, of the broad and unfamiliar civil law concept of an author’s
‘intellectual’ or ‘moral’ interests.20 The duration provision was a com-
promise between continental European and common law positions,
allowing considerable flexibility.21 Means of redress were thrown open
to be determined by individual member states according to their existing
legal systems.22
In combining brevity with some detail, article 6bis of the Berne Con-
vention stood halfway between doctrine and regulation. The fact that its
wording has never been adopted in France or Germany for their author-
ial rights indicates how little it reflected their ways of imagining the
rights. To them it was not an improvement or a clarification. But to the
common law countries it was the essential precondition to the acceptance
of rights of whose virtues those countries’ legislators remained to be
convinced.
The fixation of moral rights in treaty form created for member states
an obligation to the international community not to deviate from these
principles in their treatment of foreign, if not domestic, authors. More-
over, rules of treaty interpretation require that attention be given to more
than the bare words of the agreement, including, in some cases,
17 Italy, Decree 1950 of 7 November 1925, art. 15.
18 Poland, Law of 29 March 1926, art. 58. 19 Hungary, Law LIV of 1921, art. 3.
20 Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works:
1886–1986 (London: Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College:
Kluwer, 1987), pp. 461–2 [8.98].
21 Ibid., 462 [8.98]. 22 Ibid., 102 [3.28].
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supplementary means of interpretation such as the preparatory work for
the treaty.23 Since statutes which give effect to treaty obligations are to be
interpreted in Australia in ways not inconsistent with those obligations,24
the input of civil law countries during treaty formation remains of rele-
vance to domestic courts. There remains, in other words, an attenuated
but active connection between the transplant and the originating legal
cultures, despite the intervention of the treaty. Moreover, the capacity of
the transplant to mutate once incorporated in domestic law is greatly
restricted.
5.4 The Final Step: Connecting Moral Rights to Australian
Copyright
In Australia, moral rights came into force in late 2000, when the final act
of connection between the existing Australian law and the legal trans-
plant took place. Events of the preceding decades had prepared legal,
artistic and commercial communities for the introduction of those rights.
Interest groups had been repeatedly consulted,25 discussion papers
issued,26 reports prepared,27 bills drafted.28 Legislators had before them
the example of UK moral rights law and, to the extent that it was
relevant, US law as well as the laws of European countries. Overseas
experts had given reasoned expression in Australia to their support for
moral rights.29 Sam Ricketson too, among others, had published several
articles pointing out Australia’s international obligations to provide for
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969,
1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) arts. 31, 32.
24 Polites v. Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60, 77 (Dixon J) and 79 (McTiernan J).
25 At, inter alia, the Australian Copyright Council, Australia Council National Symposium
on Moral Rights (29–30 November 1979), the Moral Rights Consultation Forum
(18 August 1998) and the Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Discussion
(18–19 August 1997).
26 Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC), Discussion Paper – Moral Rights (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1984); Commonwealth of Australia,
Discussion Paper – Proposed Moral Rights Legislation for Copyright Creators (1994);
Australian Copyright Council, Moral Rights Bill. A Discussion Paper (2000).
27 CLRC, Report on Moral Rights (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service,
1988); Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Consideration of
Legislation Referred to the Committee, Copyright Amendment Bill 1997 (1997).
28 Copyright Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth); Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Bill
1999 (Cth).
29 David Vaver, ‘Authors’moral rights and the Copyright Law Review Committee’s report:
W[h]ither such rights now?’ (1988) 14 Monash University Law Review 284; Jane C
Ginsburg, ‘Moral rights in a common law system’ in Peter Anderson and David
Saunders (eds.), Moral Rights Protection in a Copyright System (Brisbane: Institute for
Cultural Policy Studies, Griffith University, 1992).
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moral rights, the benefits of the rights and their consistency with estab-
lished, but insufficient, legal principles.30 His was a particularly persua-
sive voice in this debate, his previously published treatise on the Berne
Convention31 giving Australian legislators important insights into the
drafting of article 6bis. This work both guided the domestic drafting of
the rights and was likely to assist in any future interpretation of the
provisions.
It is useful at this point to return to some of the questions that recur in
transplantation literature: First, did the methods used to effect the trans-
plantation involve alterations to the basic concepts of moral rights?
Second were the receiving legal structures affected by the transplant?
Finally, how effective was the transplant in achieving the ends it was
meant to achieve?
5.5 Distortions to Moral Rights?
At first sight, the moral rights provisions in Australia are extraordinary by
civil law or even Berne standards. No country in the world has elaborated
them to the extent that this country has. The abstract doctrines of their
source countries have been replaced by an exhaustive set of statutory
rules. Taking the key concepts from article 6bis of the Berne Convention,
the legislators reimagined them in an Australian legal context and gave
them the characteristics of Australian statutory rights. Certain rights
would be given; those rights would be elaborated as fully and clearly as
possible, thereby defining most of the indicia of infringement. Additional
statements of infringement would also be supplied. A range of defences
would be provided to screen out from infringement some desirable uses
of the copyright material. Duration would be spelled out, as would the
parties to exercise the rights. The rights would apply to the existing
Australian categories of works, as well as to films. Wholesale carve-outs –
of groups of authors or of copyright material – were avoided. Such carve-
outs would have seemed unnecessarily defensive in a country where,
thanks partly to Sam Ricketson’s groundwork, there was little hostility
to the rights.
Concepts already familiar from copyright law were used to connect the
moral rights to their new environment. Existing notions of authorship,
30 See especially Sam Ricketson, ‘The case for moral rights’ (1995) 25 Intellectual Property
Forum 37; Sam Ricketson, ‘Is Australia in breach of its international obligations with
respect to the protection of moral rights?’ (1990) 17(3) Melbourne University Law Review
462; Sam Ricketson, ‘Moral rights and the droit de suite: International conditions and
Australian obligations’ (1990) 3 Entertainment Law Review 78.
31 Ricketson, The Berne Convention.
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developed in Australian case law, were evidently meant to be used to
identify the recipients of the rights except in cases where the rights
extended to ‘unauthored’ material. The rights were to apply, like copy-
right, to ‘substantial parts’ of works as well as to works in their entirety.32
The attributable acts, giving rise to the need for attribution, were acts
which, for the most part, were already familiar from the list of copyright
prerogatives.33 The right against ‘false attribution’ was able to take
meaning from the falsity concept used in other areas of law.34 The word
reputation, taken from article 6bis of Berne, appeared to connect, though
in as yet unclear ways, to defamation law. Any conflict with civil law or
Berne concepts of reputation was left for the courts to deal with.
A ‘reasonableness’ defence35 in some respects resembled existing ways
of softening the force of statutory rights, though it left much room for
further judicial development.
Statements of purpose also needed to be made to persuade Parliament
of the merits of the legislation, to guide its interpretation and to establish
the normative aspects of the transplant. In Parliament it was stated that:
[This bill] is about acknowledging the great importance of respect for the
integrity of creative behaviour. At its most basic, the bill is a recognition of the
importance to Australian culture of literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works
and of those who create them.36
This statement of purpose was probably the least effective aspect of the
rights’ introduction. Although the necessary votes were garnered, the
statement failed to focus on the wrongs to be remedied by the provisions
or the practical advantages to be gained by their introduction.37
It is clear that the acclimatisation effected by the Australian drafting
has produced a set of rights differently configured within the law from
those of Europe. In that sense the modes of operation of the rights have
32 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss. 14, 195AZH. 33 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s. 31.
34 Meskenas v. ACP Publishing Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 172 [20], citing Murphy v. Farmer
(1988) 165 CLR 19.
35 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss. 195AR, 195AS.
36 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 1999,
13026 (Daryl Williams, Attorney-General).
37 State moral rights–type legislation in the US, by contrast, is much more direct in this
respect. For example, the preamble to the 1987 Pennsylvania Fine Art Preservation Act
goes straight to the point: ‘1) The careers and professional reputations of artists depend
on the physical integrity of their works of fine art. … 3) The act of altering, defacing,
mutilating or destroying a work of fine art jeopardizes and can cause irreparable damage
to the professional and economic interests of the artist. 4) In order to protect artists, and
ultimately preserve art for the benefit and enjoyment of the public, it is necessary to
afford artists certain legal rights and remedies in relation to their works of fine art’: Pa
Stat Ann §§ 2101–2110 (Purdon 1988).
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changed. On the other hand, there is little evidence that moral rights as
agreed to by the Berne negotiators have been significantly altered in
Australia. Australia has given to foreign authors, for the most part, a set
of actionable rights bearing an acceptable resemblance to the rights they
enjoy at home. If there is an exception to this it may arise from the
question of alienability and consent. Though article 6bis does not in
terms describe a fully inalienable right, it may be argued that the negoti-
ating parties intended it to do so. While Australia shied away at the last
minute from allowing the rights to be subject to waiver, it allowed for
such far-reaching consent by the rights holder as to be tantamount to an
alienation of the rights.38
5.6 Effects on Australian Copyright Culture
But have ‘irritations’ been set up in the body of Australian copyright law?
Have the rights prompted adaptations of or alterations or challenges to it?
At one level, their introduction certainly encourages new analysis of well-
established concepts. At another level, aspects of the moral rights may
point towards future directions in copyright law.
One concept which the moral rights provisions have challenged is that
of the ‘substantial part’, which introduces flexibility into questions of
infringement. When the legislators incorporated substantiality into the
moral rights provisions they did so independently of European or Berne
influence. This inclusion was not discussed in the explanatory materials,
leaving uncertainty about whether or not the legislators intended a neat
overlap with substantiality for copyright purposes. Where a substantial
part of a work has been taken by a copyright infringer, does the same
method of calculating substantiality apply when attention turns to poten-
tial moral rights infringement in the same case? It should not do so, since
‘substantial part’ is measured taking into account the interests protected
by the rights in question,39 and moral rights interests diverge sharply
from copyright interests.40 The drafting of this transplant prompts a
heightened awareness of the interest-dependent nature of the substanti-
ality concept and the importance of differentiating the two sets of rights.
38 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss. 195AW, 195AWA.
39 Discussion of the interests protected, and hence what value has been usurped by the
infringer, is common in cases concerning non-work subject matters. See, e.g., Network
Ten Pty Ltd v. TCN Channel Nine (2004) 218 CLR 273 and the associated Federal Court
judgments in this litigation.
40 For further discussion of this issue see Elizabeth Adeney, ‘Moral rights and
substantiality: Some questions of integration’ (2002) 13(1) Australian Intellectual
Property Journal 5.
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In the transplantation of moral rights into Australian law, an awkward
reclassification of films occurred. Normally classified as ‘subject matter
other than works’ under Australian law,41 they were reclassified, for the
purpose of moral rights only, as ‘works’, the classification that they carry
in the Berne Convention.42 This allowed them to be seen as having
authors. If one were looking for an irritant which could have future
consequences, this is surely a prime example. The awkwardness of the
incomplete reclassification invites law reform that would include films,
for copyright purposes as well, into the ‘works’ category. Where a film is a
product of the intellect, it is difficult to see why it would be denied the
‘work’ status in an Act which is content to classify any and every photo-
graph as a work.
Since moral rights are deeply personal to the author, a further effect of
the transplant is that renewed emphasis is placed on the humanity and
intellectuality of authorship.43 It would be highly undesirable for a rift to
open up between copyright law and moral rights law on the question of
what constitutes authorship. Thus the introduction of moral rights inevit-
ably helps to fix and maintain authorship in a form requiring ‘independ-
ent intellectual effort’, subsuming the tests of ‘sweat of the brow’ or
‘industrious collection’.44 Such subsumption is not a product of moral
rights, since it predates their introduction by many decades, but the
adoption of moral rights strongly reinforces the point.
Moral rights pose a further question for copyright law in having intro-
duced the new defence of reasonableness into the Act. An act or omis-
sion may not infringe certain moral rights if it is reasonable in the
circumstances.45 The defence is notable for being both standard based
and open ended,46 and allows courts to exercise a broad discretion in
their decision making. The provision is therefore a trail-blazer in Austra-
lian copyright law, where suggestions for an open-ended defence to
copyright infringement have so far been ignored by government, despite
41 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt IV (‘Copyright in Subject-Matter Other Than Works’).
42 Berne Convention, art. 2(1) (as amended by Paris text, 1971).
43 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s. 190.
44 IceTV Pty Ltd v. Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 458, 474 [33] (French
CJ, Crennan J and Kiefel J), citing Sands & McDougall Pty Ltd v. Robinson (1917)
23 CLR 49, 52 (Isaacs J).
45 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss. 195AR, 195AS.
46 The ALRC has noted that standards- or principles-based provisions are increasing in
Australian law: ALRC, Copyright and the Digital Economy, 99 [4.57], citing consumer
protection and privacy legislation.
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the perceived inadequacy of the present purpose-oriented fair-dealing
defences.47
While not itself a transplant, ‘reasonableness’ rolls into one word the
mechanisms that are used around the world to soften the effect of moral
rights. It particularly resembles in its effects the German ‘balancing of
interests’, setting off the interests of the author against opposing property
or commercial interests.48 In its operation it resembles the US fair use
defence, listing criteria which tribunals must apply when considering
reasonableness.49 In fact two of the applicable considerations appear to
have been transplanted from that source: the nature of the work and the
purpose of the use. This transplantation is of the least contentious kind,
however, since no more is taken than the idea of the indicative list and
non-specific wording. The fair use concept with its penumbra of juris-
prudence is not taken.
Most important is what effect the introduction of this open-ended
defence will have on Australian copyright law in the long term. For many
years the Australian government has been considering how to render the
defences to copyright infringement more responsive to community
expectations in the digital age. The adoption of a US-style fair use
exception into Australian law has been recommended by the Australian
Law Reform Commission.50 Against this background, the pre-existence
of the reasonableness defence issues a couple of challenges. First, it
challenges the opposition to standard-based defences, demonstrating
how such an open-ended defence might be constructed without causing
perceptible problems in its legal environment. Second, its existence
challenges the abovementioned preference, in the copyright context, for
a US-style fair use defence over an indigenous reasonableness defence.51
For the most part, the Australian legislators chose in 2000 to draft the
moral rights provisions in the familiar language of copyright law, evi-
dently seeing virtue in knitting the two systems as closely together as
possible. Applying the same principle of unification, a new copyright
defence could be drafted in language already adopted in moral rights
law. To be sure, distinctions would need to be made between what is
47 As early as 1998, the CLRC recommended the replacement of the present defences:
CLRC, Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968 (1998) [2.01]–[2.03], a point reiterated by
the ALRC in 2013.
48 This jurisprudential principle applies particularly to the § 14 right of integrity: Adolf
Dietz and Alexander Peukert, ‘§14 Entstellung des Werkes’ in Gerhard Schricker and
Ulrich Loewenheim (eds.), Urheberrecht: Kommentar, 5th ed. (Munich: Beck, 2017),
pp. 372–4 [26]–[34].
49 17 USC §107. 50 ALRC, Copyright and the Digital Economy, 87 [4.1].
51 Ibid., 87–9 [4.1]–[4.13], which strongly favours fair use.
74 Elizabeth Adeney
Across Intellectual Property : Essays in Honour of Sam Ricketson, edited by Graeme W. Austin, et al., Cambridge University
         Press, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/deakin/detail.action?docID=6144321.

































reasonable for moral rights purposes and what is reasonable for copyright
purposes, taking into account the interests protected. But this would be
no more complex than differentiating substantiality in the two fields. In
this way Australian law could grow from this largely indigenous seed,
borrowing ideas from the fair use doctrine where desirable, but refraining
from transplanting the term fair use which has been developed for appli-
cation in a substantially different legal framework.
5.7 The Success or Otherwise of the Transplant
The previous discussion was speculative, based on little Australian moral
rights jurisprudence. This in itself is surprising, given that more than
eighteen years have elapsed since the Berne concept of moral rights was
introduced into Australian law. Dramatically less litigation has been
generated in Australia than in the source countries of France or Germany
over the same period.52 On this evidence, some might view the rights as a
failed transplant.
From the point of view of authors in other Berne member states, for
whom these provisions were primarily introduced, the rights are func-
tional. The two successful litigations53 reassure foreign authors that
moral rights may be utilised in Australia; Australia is, in broad terms,
compliant with its treaty obligations. The paucity of litigation also indi-
cates that parties are arranging their position on moral rights at a sub-
litigation level. A normal contract in the arts industry now contains moral
rights provisions. Although most authors remain in a poor negotiating
position, parties are forced to give express attention to the rights when
dealing with each other.54
On the other hand, the development of the rights has been held back
by the failure of the provisions to generate high-level judicial interpret-
ation, litigation having occurred only at the lowest level of the federal
court structure. The exercise of the rights is not a familiar part of legal
practice and cannot yet produce predictable outcomes. This self-
perpetuating lack of case law may be contributed to by the efficacy of
the consent provisions and the relative breadth of the – still scarcely
52 In Germany, more than ten published judgments in moral rights matters have appeared
in the last three years alone, two of them in the highest court, the Federal Court of
Justice (BGH).
53 Meskenas v. ACP Publishing Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 172; Perez v. Fernandez (2012) 260
FLR 1.
54 On the questions raised by publishing contracts see Francina Cantatore and Jane
Johnston, ‘Moral rights: Exploring the myths, meanings and misunderstandings in
Australian copyright law’ (2016) 21(1) Deakin Law Review 71.
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tested55 – reasonableness defence. Litigation is also expensive, and the
risk of the author having to bear the opponent’s costs in an unsuccessful
action is daunting. Perhaps, too, the values protected by the rights – the
author’s interest in name, honour and reputation – are insufficiently
established in Australian creative culture for an investment in risky
litigation to seem worthwhile.
5.8 Conclusion
Legal transplantation incrementally universalises law and the norms it
embodies. By and large this is to be welcomed in an increasingly net-
worked world, though the need for laws to reflect the special concerns of
individual nations also remains strong. The incorporation of moral rights
into the laws of most common law countries, including Australia, was an
exceptionally attenuated process, effected through the substantial
detachment of the rights, by international treaty, from their original legal
contexts and their fixation in principles that were required to be repro-
duced, without deviation, in domestic laws. When the rights came to be
drafted for use in Australia, much effort was put into connecting them to
the copyright culture and provisions already in place. Less effort was put
into articulating the practical purposes of the rights. In 2019 the rights
are still a mere seedling in the vast copyright plantation of this country.
Whether the digital future will see the rights grow into a sturdy protector
of authorship remains to be seen.
55 The concept received only limited discussion in the Meskenas judgment, where it was
decided that the inadvertence of a failure to attribute authorship did not, in the
circumstances, satisfy the test of reasonableness: Meskenas v. ACP Publishing Pty Ltd
(2006) 70 IPR 172 [18].
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